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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from the district court of a matter over 
which the Court of Appeals did not have original jurisdiction 
under Subsection 78-2a-3(2) of the Utah Code. Hence the Suoreme 
Court had jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Subsection 
78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code. However, the Supreme Court 
transferred this matter pursuant to Subsection 78-2-2(4) of the 
Utah Code, and thus this Court has jurisdiction in accordance 
with Subsection 78-2a-3 (2)(j) of the Utah Code. 
The Notice of Appeal filed April 8, 1996 complied with 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allowing 
appellate review of the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a 
Continuance, dated and entered in this matter on December 29, 
1995; and the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial 
and to Set Aside Judgment, dated and entered in this matter on 
March 11, 1996. Record at (R. ) 166. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND EVIDENCE OF PRESERVATION 
The appellant and plaintiff Leslie Scot McNair (McNair) 
asserts that the pertinent issues and the corresponding standard 
of review are as follows, and that these issues were preserved as 
indicated: 
1. Must a defendant automobile operator moving for 
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summary judgment bear an initial burden to present evidence where 
(A) the basis for the motion is that the plaintiff injured 
pedestrian has not met any pleaded threshold requirement for 
suing for general damagesf and (B) the motion is not ruled uoon 
until the time of pretrial? This is a question of lawf with no 
need for deference to the district court's conclusions. Walker 
Drug Co., Inc. v^ La Sal Oil Co^, 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995). 
This standard of review remains the same when an error of law is 
pointed out in a motion for new trial, since it is an abuse of 
discretion not to correct an error of law made in granting a 
motion for summary judgment. Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 
P.2d 993, 997 (Utah 1982). 
This failure by Farris to bear his burden as the moving 
party was raised in McNair's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
New Trial and to Set Aside Judgment dated January 8, 1996 (R. 
108-112), in the Reoly Memorandum in Support of Motion for New 
Trial and to Set Aside Judgment dated January 29, 1996 (R. 144-
146), and in the Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and 
Request to Set Aside Judgment held February 23, 1996 (R. 175-179, 
188-190). 
2. Has an injured pedestrian sufficiently shown the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact by pleading 
permanent disability and stating at pretrial that he still has 
pain and problems more than a year after the injury and is hoping 
to be examined before trial by a medical provider where (A) the 
automobile operator has moved for summary judgment on the basis 
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162-163), in McNair's Memorandum dated December 13, 1995 (R. 88), 
in his Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and to Set 
Aside Judgment dated January 8, 1996 (R. 111-112), and in the 
Affidavit of Leslie S. McNair dated January 10, 1996 (R. 123-
124). 
3. Must a dismissal be without prejudice where (A) an 
injured pedestrian has sued a automobile operator for general and 
special damages, (B) the automobile operator has been granted 
summary judgment on the basis that the injured pedestrian cannot 
prove at trial any of the threshold requirements for a suit for 
general damages, (C) the motion is made after the matter has been 
set for trial and is granted at the time of pretrial, and (D) the 
pedestrian states that he still has pain and problems more than a 
year after the injury and is planning on obtaining medical 
attention in the very near future? This is a question of law, 
with no need for deference to the district court's conclusions. 
Id. 
McNair urged that any dismissal should be without 
prejudice at the Pre-Trial Conference held December 8, 1995 (R. 
160), in McNair1s Memorandum dated December 13, 1995 (R. 88), in 
his Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and to Set 
Aside Judgment dated January 8, 1996 (R. 113-114), in the Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and to Set Aside 
Judgment dated January 29, 1996 (R. 146-147), and in the Hearing 
on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Request to Set Aside 
Judgment held February 23, 1996 (R. 180). 
5 
Thus the record shows that each question "was timely 
presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a 
ruling thereon." Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
STATUTES, ETC., TO BE INTERPRETED 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative 
consist of the following: 
Section 31A-22-309(1) of the Utah Code: 
(1) A person who has or is required to have 
direct benefit coverage under a policy which 
includes personal injury protection may not 
maintain a cause of action for general damages 
arising out of personal injuries alleged to 
have been caused by an automobile accident, 
except where the person has sustained one or 
more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent 
impairment based upon objective findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in 
excess of $3,000. 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP): 
Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and 
management, conferences. 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, 
the court in its discretion or upon motion of a 
party, may direct the attorneys for the parties 
and any unrepresented parties to appear before 
it for a conference or conferences before trial 
for such purposes as: 
(1) expediting the disposition of the 
action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing 
control so that the case will not be protracted 
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for lack of management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial 
activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial 
through more thorough preparation; 
(5) facilitating the settlement of the 
case; and 
(6) considering other matters as may aid 
in the orderly disposition of the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. 
• • • 
(c) Final pretrial or settlement 
conferences. In any action where a final 
pretrial conference has been ordered, it shall 
be held as close to the time of trial as 
reasonable under the circumstances. The 
conference shall be attended by at least one of 
the attorneys who will conduct the trial for 
each of the parties, and the attorneys 
attending the pretrial, unless waived by the 
court, shall have available, either in person 
or by telephone, the appropriate parties who 
have authority to make binding decisions 
regarding settlement. 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's 
attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial 
order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a 
party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, 
if a party or a party's attorney is 
substantially unprepared to participate in the 
conference, or if a party or a party's attorney 
fails to participate in good faith, the court, 
upon motion or it own initiative, may make such 
orders with regard thereto as are just, and 
among others, any of the orders provided in 
Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in 
addition to any other sanctions, the court 
shall require the party or the attorney 
representing him or both to pay the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of any noncompliance 
with this rule, including attorney fees, unless 
the court finds that the noncompliance was 
substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. ... 
(b) For defending party. A party against 
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, 
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mayf at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits, for a summary judgment 
in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion or proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days before 
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. 
... 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. Suoporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn 
or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. ... 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. ... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant and appellee Daniel Farris (Farris) was 
operating an automobile and ran over McNair's foot, breaking a 
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couple of bones. McNair began receiving medical attention for 
his injury, and filed this action. He planned on paying for the 
needed surgery with his expected recovery from Farris. 
McNairfs attorney thought that a broken bone was 
sufficient to allow recovery of general damages. However, the 
Complaint also alleged the existence of permanent disability. 
Farris moved for summary judgment with a supporting 
affidavit dealing only with the fact that medical expenses had 
not exceeded $3,000. He addressed the allegation of permanent 
disability outside of the affidavit in conclusory terms. This 
motion was granted at pretrial in the face of arguments that 
McNair still had pain and problems more than a year after the 
injury and was hoping to be examined before trial by a medical 
provider. 
In denying a subsequent motion for a new trial, the 
trial court excused Farrisfs failure to carry his burden to show 
an absence of permanent disability by emphasizing that the ruling 
took place at pretrial and no evidence had been produced by 
McNair. However, no pretrial order required McNair to have named 
an expert or otherwise have produced evidence before the trial. 
The facts in more detail are as follows: 
1. On October 10, 1994 in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
defendant Farris drove an automobile over the foot of plaintiff 
McNair. R. 1-2. 
2. McNair filed a Complaint dated October 17, 1994 in 
Third District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah, stating that 
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Farris had been negligent and that McNair should have a judgment 
against him for the damage and loss arising from the injuries he 
caused McNair to suffer. R. 1-3. 
3. The said Complaint specified that the injuries, 
damage and loss included (a) fracture of bones in left foot; (b) 
injury to soft tissues in left foot and ankle; (c) permanent 
disability; (d) pain and suffering, both mental and physical, 
past and future; (e) medical bills, past and future; and (f) loss 
of earnings and earning capacity. R. 2. 
4. In response, Farris filed an Answer and Demand for 
Jury Trial dated November 1, 1994. R. 7-12. 
5. The parties then each pursued discovery. R. 13-56. 
6. During the course of this discovery, Farris explored 
the issue of permanent disability in the deposition taken of 
McNair on February 9, 1995. The following is recorded on page 38 
of the transcript of that deposition and affirmed as true in a 
subsequent affidavit executed by McNair and filed with the trial 
court: 
Q. So, you got a release, then to go back to 
work recently; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you anticipate further treatment? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you have a pending appointment with Dr. 
Gordon? 
A. No. 
Q. Has he told you anything along the lines 
that you are going to have a permanent injury, or did 
he give you any indication of what the future will 
hold? 
A. No. 
Q. At the present time, Lee, do you have — 
what problems are you having with your foot? 
A. Extreme soreness. I have a problem with 
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balance. The foot is weaker now. My leg is weaker, 
now, in fact, from being casted. I suppose that will 
come back. It is still very, very sore. It was 
crushed and it was crushed slowly. The tire was 
turning and grinding on it. It is taken a lot longer 
to heal. It is not one simple injury, you know. Had I 
tripped and snapped a bone, you know, perhaps it would 
be simpler. 
R. 123. 
7. McNair filed a Certification of Readiness for Trial. 
R. 57-58. On September 26, 1995 the trial court responded by 
setting December 11, 1995 as the date of the jury trial, and 
scheduling a pretrial conference for December 8, 1995. R. 59. 
8. Farris then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated November 17, 1995. R. 61. 
9. Farris !s Motion was based on the fact that McNair 
had not yet incurred medical expenses in the amount of $3,000. 
Thus he had not satisfied one of the alternative threshold 
requirements under the no-fault law listed in Section 31^-22-309 
of the Utah Code. R. 63-68. 
10. McNair's attorney had been under the impression 
that a fracture was still sufficient under the statute to allow a 
claim for general damages. R. 123. 
11. Therefore, McNair responded with a Motion for 
Continuance of Trial Date, dated November 22, 1995. R. 72-73. 
12. In his supporting Memorandum, McNair acknowledged 
that his medical expenses to date were less than $3,000. R. 74. 
However, he pointed out that he could still meet the threshold by 
proving "permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon 
objective findings" as found in Section 31A-22-309(1)(c). R. 74. 
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He sought a continuance to be better able to do that. R. 74-76. 
13. Farris filed a Reply Memorandum dated November 29, 
1995, and included therein the unsupported assertion that there 
was no "evidence to suggest that the plaintiff will be found to 
have a permanent disability or permanent impairment for the 
fractures of the left third and fourth metatarsal of his foot." 
R. 81-82. 
14. At the pretrial conference on December 8f 1995, 
McNair1s counsel reviewed the difficulties encountered in 
obtaining a doctor's opinion as to permanent impairment based on 
the pain and problems McNair still suffered, and indicated that 
if the Motion for Summary Judgment were to be granted, it should 
be without prejudice. R. 157-158, 160. 
15. The trial court initially denied the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, but indicated that if there were no permanent 
injury shown at trial, McNair might have to pay the jury fees. 
R. 162. 
16. McNair1s counsel offered to have the Motion granted 
in the event a doctor were to tell him that afternoon that there 
was no permanent injury. R. 162. 
17. Farris1s counsel argued that discovery had been 
conducted for months, that no evidence had been presented before 
the Court that there was a permanent impairment, that medical 
records had been provided but no experts designated, and that the 
Motion was ripe for an immediate ruling. R. 162-163. 
18. However, no order had been entered requiring 
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designation of expert witnesses. R. 1-84. Furthermore, the 
names of the doctors attending McNair, and whom he intended to 
see, were on those medical records provided to Farris. R. 78, 
157, 163. 
19. Based on the fact that a ruling was indeed due on 
the Motion, and deciding it was well-taken, the trial court 
granted Farris's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 164. 
20. Despite McNair1s subsequent objection (R. 86), the 
trial court executed an Order finding no cause of action, with 
prejudice. R. 99-100. 
21. Through new counsel, McNair filed a Motion for New 
Trial, pointing out that Farris had never carried his burden in 
moving for summary judgment, that there was a viable issue of 
fact for trial, and that prejudice should not have attached. R. 
105-116. 
22. That motion was denied, with the trial court 
emphasizing how little time had remained before trial. R. 190-
194. 
23. Thereafter McNair instituted this appeal. R. 166. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. In moving for summary judgment, Farris did not carry 
his burden of proving there was no genuine issue regarding the 
no-fault threshold. 
Farris supplied no affidavit affirming that McNair did 
not suffer permanent disability or permanent impairment as a 
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result of being injured by Farris. His motion could not be 
properly granted in the absence of such an affidavit. 
His burden of proof was not lightened as the time of 
trial neared and a final pretrial was held. 
2. In his opposition to the summary judgment motion 
unsupoorted by an affidavit regarding permanent impairment, 
McNair raised a genuine issue of material fact through his 
pleadings and by stating at pretrial that he still had pain and 
problems more than a year after the injury. 
There was no special knowledge required of an expert to 
assist the trier of fact in determining whether McNair's symptoms 
evidenced permanent disability or permanent impairment. 
Nevertheless, McNairfs assertion of this issue of fact 
was bolstered by his expected examination before trial by a 
medical provider. The fact that the provider was not identified 
as an expert witness was irrelevant since he was named in 
discovery and since the court had not ordered such 
identif ication. 
3. A dismissal at pretrial for failure to meet the 
threshold requirements should not be with prejudice. McNair 
never had a trial at which to prove the threshold requirements 
were met. 
Furthermore, a dismissal with prejudice could prevent 
recovery for soecial damages, and would prohibit recovery of 




1. IN MOVING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FARRIS DID NOT CARRY 
HIS BURDEN OF PROVING THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING THE 
NO-FAULT THRESHOLD. 
Farris had the initial burden. 
The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is 
on the moving party. It is not enough for that party to make 
bare allegations that the non-movinq party has no evidence to 
support its position. 
McNair alleged in his Complaint that "plaintiff was 
caused to and continues to suffer from ... (c) Permanent 
disability." R. 2. 
This allegation, if proven at trial, would allow McNair 
to maintain a cause of action for general damages pursuant to 
Section 31A-22-309 of the Utah Code. 
However, Farris in his Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting material did not address this allegation. The closest 
he came was the unsupported allegation that McNair1s injuries did 
not constitute a "serious impairment of bodily function." R. 66. 
The affidavit supporting the Motion only dealt with an 
alternative basis found in that Section of the Code, namely, "(e) 
medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000." 
As indicated above, Farris had explored the issue of 
permanent disability in the deposition taken of McNair on 
February 9, 1995. He knew of this evidence concerning the 
residual effects of McNair's injury, but he did not marshall it 
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for the court's benefit. 
Farris also failed to provide the court with an 
affidavit to show that there was no permanent disability. This 
was the burden that Farris, as the moving party, had to carry. 
The case of Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 
1229 (Utah 1995) is instructive on this point. In that case, the 
issue was whether damage occurred within three years prior to the 
filing of the action. If it did, the statute of limitation did 
not bar an action by the Walkers based on a continuing nuisance. 
La Sal moved for summary judgment, claiming the Walkers 
had produced no evidence of such recent damage. However, the 
opinion noted that the Walkers had no duty to produce such 
evidence in the absence of an affidavit demonstrating that no 
damage had occurred that recently. 
[A]s the moving party, La Sal had the initial 
burden to present evidence that the Walkers did 
not sustain such damage, and the Walkers were 
under no obligation to present opposing 
evidence until La Sal met that burden. See K ^ 
T\_ Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 
1994); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Because La Sal failed to present evidence that 
the Walkers did not sustain any damage within 
three years prior to the filing of their 
complaint, the Walkers may not be penalized for 
failing to present evidence in opposition. Id. 
at 1233. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the summary 
judgment that had been granted on that issue. 
In the case cited in that quote, K £ ZJL Inc. v. 
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623 (Utah 1994), summary judgment was reversed 
on the same basis. 
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In the K _& T case, Montana Brand had to show that there 
were no disputed material issues of fact regarding its lack of 
actual knowledge. The company supolied an affidavit that no one 
was informed by First Security Bank, and an affidavit from 
Koroulis that he didnft inform anyone. However, the company did 
not supply an affidavit showing that it did not acquire this 
knowledge from some other source. 
Therefore, "Montana Brand failed to meet its affirmative 
burden, as the party moving for summary judgment, of establishing 
that there were no disputed material issues of fact." Tj3. at 
628. 
In the case of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed. 265 (1986), one of the fiv^ justices 
joining the majority, Justice White, wrote in a concurring 
opinion to clearly describe the burden of the moving party in a 
motion for summary judgment: 
I also agree that the movant may rely on 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
the like, to demonstrate that the plaintiff has 
no evidence to prove his case and hence that 
there can be no factual disoute. But the 
movant must discharge the burden the Rules 
place upon him: I_t jjs not enough to move for 
summary judgment without supoorting the motion 
in any way or with a conclusory assertion that 
the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his 
case. :id. 477 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 
(White, J., concurring). (Emphasis added.) 
This concurring opinion is cited for these orinciples by 
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Blackmun, two of the three other dissenters: 
Plainly, a conclusory assertion that the 
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nonmoving party has no evidence is 
insufficient. See ante, at 2555 (WHITE, J., 
concurring). Such a "burden" of production is 
no burden at all and would simply permit 
summary judgment procedure to be converted into 
a tool for harassment. Id. 477 U.S. at 3 32, 
106 S.Ct. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Farris supplied no affidavit affirming that McNair did not suffer 
permanent disability or permanent impairment. 
Unless and until Farris properly met his burden to 
demonstrate the absence of a material fact, McNair had no 
obligation to bring forth evidence of a permanent disability. So 
how can his failure to fulfill this obligation which he did not 
yet have demonstrate a purported absence of an issue as to that 
fact and shift the burden to McNair to then bring forth such 
evidence? 
Farris could have borne his burden in one of two ways. 
He could have shown that the pleadings raised no such issue, or 
he could have provided admissible evidence that there was no 
permanent disability. 
Farris could not show that the pleadings did not raise 
the issue, since McNair alleged in his Complaint that "plaintiff 
was caused to and continues to suffer from , (c) Permanent 
disability." R. 2. Furthermore, Farris did not provide any 
evidence that there was no permanent disability. 
Thus Farris utterly failed to carry the burden required 
of a party making a motion for summary judgment. 
Farris could have had an independent medical examination 
of McNair and thereby obtained evidence of a lack of permanent 
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injury, if indeed there was none. He failed to do so. Rather, 
he did not address the specific allegation of permanent injury at 
all, making only the bare assertion, "Injuries claimed by 
plaintiff do not constitute a 'serious impairment of bodily 
function1 and do not meet the threshold requirements of the no-
fault automobile insurance act." R. 66. 
In the case cited by Farris in support of his motion, 
Zoldas v. Louise Cab Corp., 489 N.Y.S.2d 468 (A.D.I Oept. 1985), 
the moving parties not only marshalled all evidence showing the 
seriousness of the injury, but the affidavit of their neurologist 
finding no abnormalities. They had borne their burden. Farris 
here has provided no such evidence. 
Since there was no affidavit or other evidence that 
McNair did not have a permanent disability, Farrisfs burden as 
the moving party was not met. Thus McNair could not be oenalized 
for failing to provide evidence in opoosition. 
Farris1s burden was not any less at pretrial held shortly before 
trial. 
The trial court indicated at the hearing on McNair!s 
Motion for a New Trial that he agreed with the foregoing 
principles of the law, but that they did not apply at the time of 
pretrial, a few days before trial. R. 190-191. 
However, as McNair stated to the trial court, there is 
nothing in the rules or case law indicating that the movant's 
burden is decreased if the summary judgment motion is made just 
before trial. R. 188. 
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Clearly Rule 56 URCP draws no distinction based upon the 
time remaining before trial. 
Rule 16(c) URCP does refer to the time of trialf 
indicating a final pretrial should be held as close to the time 
of trial as reasonable. It specifies that trial counsel should 
be present, and the parties should be available. 
The notice of the final pretrial was just thatf merely 
a notice of the time, place and date. R. 59. Plaintiff and his 
counsel were present. R. 157. Thus there was compliance with 
Rule 16 (c). 
Rule 16(a) URCP deals with pretrial conferences in 
general. It lists purposes for pretrial conferences, which in 
summary are to manage the case for purposes of efficiency and 
settlement. The rule does not change the law applicable to 
summary judgment motions. 
Finally, Rule 16(d) addresses sanctions. The grounds 
listed for sanctions are essentially first, the failure to obey 
an order or second, the failure to appear ready to participate as 
required by the rule. 
Generally, the failure to obey an order is the basis for 
sanctions under Rule 16. The rule references parts of Rule 37(b) 
as examples of appropriate sanctioning orders. That rule also 
deals with sanctions for disobedience of a court order. 
Thus the case of Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 
1993) upheld a sanction where there was noncompliance with an 
order. On the other hand, the case of Berrett v. Denver and Rio 
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Grande W^ _ R1, 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 836 
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) found an abuse of discretion where the 
trial court excluded testimony of an expert witness in the 
absence of a court order setting a deadline for naming such 
witnesses. 
In the instant matter, there was no prior order. Hence 
no sanctions could be based on a failure to obey an order. 
As to the other basis for sanctions, the failure to 
appear ready to participate as required by the rule, both McNair 
and his attorney were present at the time set. R. 157. They 
were both ready and willing to participate as required by the 
rule. There was no mention of any failure on their part to 
participate in settlement discussions or otherwise at the 
pretrial. 
Obviously the trial court had concerns that McNair would 
be unprepared for trial, and that perhaps he could not carry his 
burden at that time. R. 162. In fact, he felt that if McNair 
could not go forward to prove his case on the day of trial, the 
lack of preparation might well warrant assessment of additional 
costs. R. 162. 
However, no scheduling order had been violated because 
there was none. McNair and his attorney adequately prepared for 
and participated at pretrial. Thus there were no grounds for 
sanctions under Rule 16 URCP. 
There is no penumbra to the rules which will allow a 
trial court to say at the final pretrial, "I do not believe you 
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will have the evidence you need for a prima facie case at trial, 
so your case is dismissed," even when adding the phrase, "since 
there is a summary judgment motion pending against you." The 
rules applicable to motions for summary judgment cannot be 
abrogated in that manner. 
The case of Jepson v. State Dept. of Corrections, 846 
P.2d 485 (Utah Apo. 1993) stands for the proposition that a case 
may be filed before the threshold requirements of Section 31A-22-
309 are met. It states that the injured party has until the time 
of tjrial, not just until pretrial, to prove compliance with those 
requirements. 
Thus McNair never had a duty to produce evidence of a 
permanent injury. It was an error of law for the trial court to 
dismiss his action for failing to produce such evidence in 
compliance with a burden he did not have. 
The trial court was evidently correct in concluding that 
Farris's Motion was timely and deserved a ruling. R. 164. 
However, the appropriate and correct ruling would have been a 
denial. As it was, McNair faced an unwarranted surprise and 
ambush in having to carry a burden at pretrial which under the 
law he was not required to carry until trial. 
2. IN HIS OPPOSITION TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
UNSUPPORTED BY AN AFFIDAVIT REGARDING PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT, 
McNAlR RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT. 
McNair could rely on his pleadings« 
Since Farris had not used any affidavits to support his 
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position regarding permanent injury, McNair was entitled to rely 
upon the Complaint to raise an issue of fact. 
As indicated above, McNair alleged in his Complaint that 
"plaintiff was caused to and continues to suffer from ... (c) 
Permanent disability." R. 2. 
The case of Gadd v^ Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah 
1984) stated: 
When read in light of section (b) of Rule 56, 
which provides that the oarty moving for 
summary judgment may do so "with or without 
supporting affidavits," it is clear that the 
section (e) requirement that a oarty opposing 
the summary judgment motion file 
counter-affidavits applies only when the moving 
party has elected to and has filed affidavits 
in support of the motion. If, as in this case, 
the moving party chooses not to or simply fails 
to file affidavits, section (e) is 
inapplicable. 
The case of Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 
11 Utah 2d 1, 4-5, 354 P.2d 559 (1960), stated: 
A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser 
shows that, "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Such showing must preclude all reasonable 
possibility that the loser could, if given a 
trial, produce evidence which would reasonably 
sustain a judgment in his favor. 
Evidence showed that McNair had permanent disability or 
impairment. 
As indicated above, McNair stated the following in his 
deposition: 
Q. So, you got a release, then to go back to 
work recently; is that right? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And do you anticipate further treatment? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you have a pending appointment with Dr. 
Gordon? 
A. No. 
0. Has he told you anything along the lines 
that you are going to have a permanent injury, or did 
he give you any indication of what the future will 
hold? 
A. No. 
Q. At the present time, Lee, do you have — 
what problems are you having with your foot? 
A. Extreme soreness. I have a problem with 
balance. The foot is weaker now. My leg is weaker, 
now, in fact, from being casted. I suppose that will 
come back. It is still very, very sore. It was 
crushed and it was crushed slowly. The tire was 
turning and grinding on it. It is taken a lot longer 
to heal. It is not one simple injury, you know. Had I 
tripped and snapped a bone, you know, perhaps it would 
be simpler. 
R. 123. 
That excerpt alone, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to McNair, shows that McNair was capable of producing 
evidence at trial which would have sustained a judgment in his 
favor. 
As indicated above and as McNair argued at the pretrial, 
he still had symptoms, he still had oain and other problems. R. 
157. The jury would not have needed more than the testimony and 
demonstrative evidence provided by McNair to reasonably conclude, 
based upon objective findings, that McNair was suffering from a 
permanent disability or permanent impairment. 
Exper_t testimony was not required. 
McNair produced an affidavit in support of his motion 
for continuance, describing efforts in connection with another 
medical examination. R. 77-78. The fact that such efforts to 
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obtain an additional medical examination had not yet been 
successful would not have justified granting Farris's motion. 
An expert medical ooinion is only needed where the fact 
to be found cannot be based on "the common knowledge and 
experience of the layman." Nixdorf v. Hickenf 612 P.2d 348, 352 
(Utah 1980). 
This Court more recently discussed the necessity for 
expert testimony in Salt Lake City S_^  D^ y_^  Galbraith j* Green, 
740 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1987). 
The issue in that case was whether there was a breach by 
an insurance consultant of its duty to provide legal advice. The 
Court set forth the following principles as the basis for its 
holding that expert testimony was not required to show the 
standard of care: 
If the matter at issue in the case is one 
which requires special knowledge not held by 
the trier of fact, expert evidence must be 
presented. If, however, the matter is one 
which is within the knowledge of the average 
trier of fact, no expert testimony is 
required. [Citations.] 
Expert testimony is not required "simply 
because the circumstances are outside the 
average juror's experience if the other 
evidence is such as to oresent the issues in 
terms which the jury can be expected to 
understand." [Citation.] If the jury is 
capable of understanding the primary facts of 
the case and drawing correct conclusions from 
them, no expert testimony is required. Ld. at 
289. 
Here, the injury was over a year old. Since McNair was 
still suffering a disability at the time of trial, the jury would 
be qualified to reasonably and justifiably find that the 
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disability was permanent. This issue was not so technical as to 
have required expert opinion. 
An expert witness would likely have testified. 
Had the date for trial remained set, it is likely that 
McNair and his treating physicians would have made extraordinary 
efforts and would have presented expert testimony at trial 
concerning the permanency and extent of McNairfs injuries. 
In arguing against McNair's Motion for a New Trial, 
Farris stated that it was irrelevant that McNair had until the 
time of trial to produce his evidence, since the date set foi^  
trial had passed. R. 134. Thus Farris once again urged the 
trial court to penalize McNair for failing to carry a burden he 
did not have. McNair had until the trial to produce evidence of 
permanent injury. Once the trial court denied McNair a trial, he 
had no duty to produce such evidence before the date previously 
set for the trial. 
Farris emphasized to the judge at pretrial that no 
expert witness had been designated. However, there was no order 
requiring such designation. Moreover, McNair informed the trial 
court that the names of the doctors he had seen and planned on 
consulting with had been furnished to Farris. R. 78, 157, 163. 
Thus there was no basis for excluding as witnesses the 
doctors McNair planned to see. As mentioned above, the case of 
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 
1992), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) found an abuse of 
discretion where the trial court excluded testimony of an expert 
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witness in the absence of a court order setting a deadline for 
naming such witnesses. 
3. A DISMISSAL AT PRETRIAL FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE 
THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT BE WITH PREJUDICE. 
The statute provides for general damages upon meeting the 
threshold. 
Not only was the summary judgment dismissing the action 
an error in law, but it was error to dismiss the case with 
prejudice. 
Farris cited the case of Tucker v. Walkerf 335 So.2d 636 
(Fla. App. 1976), for the proposition that a dismissal for 
failure to meet the no-fault threshold requirements should be 
with prejudice. R. 94. 
It is true that the Tucker opinion upheld a dismissal 
with prejudice. However, in so doing, it distinguished two prior 
cases where the ruling was that the dismissal should have been 
without prejudice. The basis of the distinction was that in 
Tucker the issues were resolved against the claimant by a jury. 
Likewise another case cited by Farrisf Coughlin v. 
LaBounty, 354 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. App. 1984), involved a situation 
where the facts had been found by a jury. 
In the instant matter, McNair sought to present his case 
to a jury, including proof of his satisfaction of the threshold 
requirements, but he never got that chance. 
One of the prior cases cited and distinguished by Tucker 
was Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974). 
27 
There the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the threshold statute and the dismissal of the complaint filed. 
However, it stated that the dismissal must be without prejudice, 
since to hold otherwise would deprive the injured parties fro^ n 
the remedy allowed by the legislature for persons in their 
situation: 
As noted earlier, the appellants in this action 
have now in fact exceeded the one thousand 
dollar "threshold" requirement of F.S. Sec. 
627.737(2), F.S.A., and thus would be entitled, 
under the act, to pursue their claims for 
intangible damages for pain and suffering, 
etc., absent the trial court's order of 
dismissal prior to such a showing. To allow 
the earlier dismissal of the complaint with 
prejudice to stand would have the effect of 
depriving the appellants of their rights under 
the statute by virtue of dismissal of an action 
that had not accrued as of the time of 
dismissal. Under such an interpretation, the 
dismissal in the instant cause would bar all 
recovery despite qualification thereafter to 
sue. We find such a construction untenable and 
hold that the plaintiff may sue for such 
damages once the "threshold" has been crossed, 
so long as it is within the statute of 
limitations. _Id. at 23. 
This holding was followed in the case of Smith v. U. S. 
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 305 So.2d 216 (Fla. App. 1974), where 
the depositions and written interrogatories revealed that the 
medical expenses were too low and that there was no evidence 
adduced to show any disability. That opinion found no error in 
the dismissal except that it was entered with prejudice. | 
A dismissal without prejudice does not increase uncertainty^ 
Farris urged that dismissal without prejudice would be 
bad policy. He argued that so doing would introduce considerable 
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uncertainty in the law, citing Jepson, supra, R. 133-134. 
In Jeoson, the uncertainty referred to was that of 
extending the statute of limitations to the distant future when 
the threshold might be crossed. There is no such problem when a 
case is dismissed without prejudice. The most the time for 
filing is extended beyond the normal statute of limitations is 
one year after dismissal. The pertinent statute, Section 78-12-
40 of the Utah Code, extends the limitation period to that extent 
for practically every case dismissed without prejudice. There is 
no reason for the normal extension period to cause greater 
problems in the context of the no-fault threshold than in any 
other context. 
In this case, McNair was injured in 1994 and had until 
1998 to file initially. So a dismissal without prejudice would 
not have extended at all the time of uncertainty that Farris 
originally faced. 
h dismissal with prejudice could wrongfully preclude recovery of 
special damages. 
As indicated in the excerpt of McNair1s deposition 
quoted above, McNair did not know in February of 19 95 if future 
medical treatment would be necessary. Later, in view of his 
deteriorated condition, his doctor advised him to have surgery 
performed. R. 124. 
No meeting of any threshold requirements is required in 
an action for actual medical expenses and lost wages. Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). Noon v. Smith, 829 
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P.2d 922 (Kan. App. 1992). 
However, a dismissal with prejudice not only prevents 
any compensation for general damages, but may well also be 
considered res judicata so as to preclude McNair from receiving 
any compensation for medical expenses and other special damages 
beyond the limits of the personal injury protection payments. 
This demonstrates another good reason for the courts to 
hold, as they have, that any dismissal for failure to meet the 
threshold requirements, except when the matter has gone to trial, 
must be without prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, it should 
reverse the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial* 
The case should then be remanded for trial. 
The basis for such a reversal is that in moving for 
summary judgment, Farris did not carry his initial burden of 
showing there was no genuine issue regarding the no-fault 
threshold. It was irrelevant that a ruling on his motion came at 
the time of final pretrial. 
An additional and alternative basis is that even though 
he had no duty to do so, McNair raised a genuine issue of 
material fact by stating at pretrial that he still had pain and 
problems more than a year after the injury. Such evidence would 
support a finding of permanent disability or permanent 
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impairment. Expert testimony was also expected and permissible. 
In the alternative, this Court should so reverse the 
aspect of prejudice. That is, the Court should rule that the 
dismissal of this action must be reentered without prejudice. 
The basis for such a ruling is that McNair had until 
trial to prove the threshold requirements would be met and no 
trial was ever held. 
Furthermore, McNair either has already satisfied one of 
the threshold requirements, or such satisfaction is imminent. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. 
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